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Cet article examine la situation des "refugies de l'interieur" dans un pays oh la 
guerre civile oppose depuis de nombreuses annees le Nord contre le Sud et oh 
la famine menace constamment les plus pauvres. Au-dela des effets de la guerre 
et de la famine, l'auteur evoque les changements dans les droits fomiers qui, 
dans l'ensemble du pays, ont prive des agriculteurs et des eleveurs de leurs 
terres au profit de grandes plantations mecanisees privees. L'extension et la 
multiplication de ces vastes domaines, tres visibles dans le paysage, sont 
fortement encourages par le gouvernement en raison de leur contribution aux 
exportations des cultures de rente. L'auteur decrit ensuite les evhements qui 
jalonnent la periode recente du conflit et les succes et obstacles que rencontrent 
les organisations humanitaires pour distribuer l'assistance dans un pays d4- 
chire par la guerre civile. 
Introduction 
The rains in southern Sudan usually 
begin in April. They mark the end of 
the government's annual military of- 
fensive against the Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA) in the south. 
This past dry season-from about 
January to March-was a bloody one 
in southern Sudan. The armed forces 
of the government were able to get the 
upper hand against the SPLA, which 
has been embroiled in infighting. Re- 
ports of new assaults appeared in the 
western media in mid-February this 
year. Fighting led to a large movement 
of refugees travelling toward the 
Ugandan border. This latest assault 
was accompanied by a drought that 
put 1.5 million people at risk of starva- 
tion in southern Sudan. Aid workers 
say that unless food comes quickly, 
they can "contemplate the worst fam- 
ine in Sudan since 1988, when up to 
300,000 people died" (Economist 1994, 
February 12). 
This article considers the internally 
displaced in Sudan, the context of 
these displacement, and the difficul- 
ties international nongovernmental 
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organizations (INGOs) have faced in 
trying to get aid to those who are in 
need. The displacement of people in 
Sudan occurs in a cycle of war, disloca- 
tion, drought, flood and famine, along 
with the effects of pushinglpulling 
peasants off common lands. This 
movement off land is accompanied by 
a move from sustainable agriculture to 
unsustainable monoculture. Follow- 
ing this introduction is a description of 
the land and situation in Sudan which 
is strongly affected by mechanized 
farming. This is followed by a descrip- 
tion of the reasons for displacement in 
the country. The last section recounts 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), an 
agreement between military groups 
and aid agencies for the free passage of 
aid to those affected by drought and 
famine. 
The Current Situation 
There are an estimated 28 million peo- 
ple who belong to 132 distinct ethnic 
groups in Sudan, the largest country in 
Africa. People of Arabic race and Mus- 
lim religion/culture live in the north 
and dominate the capital, Khartoum. 
They are also found in central Sudan 
where they are mainly riverine farm- 
ers, pastoralists or rain-dependent 
farmers. Camel breeders live a no- 
madic life in the scrubland of the north 
and west, and to the south, the Baggara 
Arabs herd cattle, 
The southern Sudanese comprise 30 
percent of the population consisting of 
two main groups: the Nilotic group of 
cattle-herding Dinka, Nuer and 
Shilluk whose animals graze the cen- 
tral grassland of the south; and the 
Christians and animists, who cultivate 
the wooded lands along the borders of 
the country. 
Sudan has a complex demographic 
make-up that has been reduced to a 
North-South dualism supported by 
racial, ethnic, cultural and religious 
differences, with corresponding politi- 
cal and economic disparities. The 
north comprises two-thirds of the land 
mass and population of the country, 
and dominates the south, which re- 
mains largely undeveloped. Tensions 
which naturally occur between north 
and south are further inflamed by a 
process of Islamization that has be- 
come very aggressive in the latter part 
of this century. 
Half of the people who live in the 
south of Sudan have been uprooted. 
They left their homes primarily be- 
cause of war and drought, and 1994 
marks the eleventh year of war be- 
tween the government of Sudan and 
the southern Sudanese who are cur- 
rently on the defensive. Besides 
600,000 displaced in the south, some 
two million others have moved 
north-many migrating to the squat- 
ter settlements around Khartoum. 
Four hundred thousand others have 
left the country for refugee camps in 
Uganda, Zaire, Kenya, Ethiopia and 
the Central African Republic (Econo- 
mist 1994, February 12). Most of these 
people originated from the hardest hit 
regions of Western and Eastern 
Equatoria (ibid; see map). 
The Land 
The White Nile runs through Eastern 
Equatoria, feeding the largest swamp 
in the world. This mosquito and croco- 
dile-infested expanse known as "The 
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Barrier" is one of the SPLA's major 
strongholds. In the dry season, how- 
ever, some of the swamp dries, making 
it accessible to the military, and forcing 
many people to flee. 
In the province of Bahr el Ghazal to 
the southwest, relief officials report 
that more than 200,000 people have 
been surviving by gathering wild food. 
In the same region, United Nations 
officials estimate that since 1989, a 
wasting disease carried by a sand fly 
has killed more than 60,000 people 
trapped by fighting. The disease, Kala- 
Azar or visceral leishmaniasis, can be 
cured in thirty days by proper medical 
attention (Lorch 1993). 
Sudan is a fertile country, but the 
areas from which people are being dis- 
placed, and the areas in which the gov- 
ernment is building "peace camps" for 
their forced resettlement, tend to be 
incapable of supporting life. Some of 
these are located in the desert 30 km 
west of Khartoum. The wind there 
never stops blowing; it is abrasive to 
exposed skin and eyes. Under the sand 
the ground is so rocky that latrines can- 
not be dug deep enough to guard 
against diseases (Flint 1993, March 13). 
Further south and west of the Nuba 
Mountains (see map), food shortages 
have led the government to relocate 
the Nuba to peace camps. One-sixth of 
the Nuba population (163,000) are now 
held in one hundred "peace vil- 
lages"-a number of which are in 
Kordofgn's provincial capital of 
Khdugli. In these camps, men are con- 
spicuous by their absence. Reporter 
Julie Flint of the Manchester Guardian 
spoke with women about the absence 
of men. They said that their husbands 
were either shot by government forces 
before the relocation, or later, after 
having arrived in Khdugli. Other re- 
ports suggest that some of the men 
have been taken from Kadugli to 
Nahud-a groundnut farming area 
outside the Nuba Mountains that suf- 
fers from chronic labour shortages 
(ibid). 
Some of the peace camps are in 
northern Kordofln, while others are 
even further afield. The Nuba are not 
allowed to leave the peace villages 
under threat of being shot. The camps 
are located in the precarious geopoliti- 
cal boundary between north and south 
Sudan. A relief worker commented: 
Look at the location of these peace 
villages: most are in insecure areas. 
The Nuba are being used as human 
shields [by the government] (Flint 
1993, April 24). 
Many of the peace villages are also in 
the vicinity of large mechanized farms 
where Nuba land has been sold to the 
Jalleba-the urbanized, Arab trading 
class-who exploit the camps for 
cheap labour. Health conditions in the 
camps are dreadful. 
In as-Salaam, two clinics treat three 
hundred children everyday, despite 
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a shortage of medicine. In a nearby 
squatter settlement, Dar-as-Salaam, 
there is only one functioning bore 
hole for 218,000 people (Flint 1993, 
April 30). 
The need for camps is partly the result 
of a change of land tenure endorsed by 
the government that has resulted in 
the development of many large mecha- 
nized farms. 
Mechanization of Farming and the 
Loss of Soil/Nutrients 
Mechanized farms now dominate ag- 
ricultural land in Sudan. Since inde- 
pendence, the Jalleba, who have 
dispersed throughout Sudan and the 
neighbouring countries, have focused 
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on large-scale rain-fed mechanized 
farms. The 1970 Unregistered Land 
Act facilitated a restructuring of land 
tenure by evicting or buying off peas- 
ants and ignoring traditional rights to 
common grazing lands. The establish- 
' 
ment of mechanized farms has been 
strongly supported by the government 
since the 1970s because they provide 
cash crops for export, particularly sor- 
ghum (83 percent of total cropped 
area) and sesame (16 percent). Mecha- 
nized farming, as practised in Sudan, 
is really tractorized farming as it in- 
volves no other machines. Usually 
only ploughing and seeding are 
mechanized, while land clearance, 
weeding, planting and harvesting con- 
tinue to be done by hand. These prac- 
tices create high demands for a mobile 
wage labour force. 
There are 34 million hectares of rain- 
fed arable land in Sudan. Mechanized 
farming is consuming this land at a 
staggering pace, a trend observed 
since the late 1960s. In 1968 there were 
2.5 million hectares of land under cul- 
tivation, today there are 7.5 million 
hectares. This doubled the amount of 
land under traditional rain-fed agri- 
culture to 3.8 million hectares (Suliman 
1993a, 6). These farming practices are 
far from sustainable: quick economic 
returns are emphasized with the 
knowledge that there is still yet more 
land to plant when the present land 
becomes depleted; fallow periods and 
crop rotation tend not to be practised. 
Shrinking yields render land under 
mechanized farming unprofitable af- 
ter about seven years. With the par- 
ticularly marginal soils and low 
rainfall of Sudan, soil degrades quickly 
and is slow to rejuvenate. The effect is 
that the topsoil on approximately half 
of the rain-fed arable land in Sudan, or 
seventeen million hectares, has been 
lost (Suliman 1993a, 19). Loss of plant 
cover, particularly of trees used for 
gum arabic or fuelwood, also contrib- 
utes to topsoil loss. Almost all of the 
forests in eastern Sudan have been 
cleared for mechanized farming. If this 
trend continues, there will be no for- 
ests in northern Sudan in the next dec- 
ade (ibid). 
Mechanized farms account for the 
bulk of cash crops available for export 
from the country, although these farms 
are controlled by just one percent of 
farmers. Some 8,000 largely absent 
leaseholders, tend to be horizontally 
structured in the production, distribu- 
tion, and trading of their cash crops. 
Meanwhile, traditional subsistence 
agriculture still forms the basis of live- 
lihood for two to three million peasant 
farmers (Suliman 1993,106). 
Sudan has been partially forced into 
the production of cash crops through 
mechanized farming. In the twenty 
year period between 1972 and 1992 
Sudan's foreign debt increased from 
$298 million to $14 billion. Exports to- 
talled $315 million while imports were 
valued at $1.3 billion. Its GDP in 1992 
was $5.2 billion with an inflation rate 
of 150 percent and unemployment at 
30 percent. This economic situation al- 
lowed the WorldBank to impose struc- 
tural adjustment plans over the twenty 
years of borrowing. In turn, these plans 
have encouraged the export of pro- 
duce from mechanized agriculture. 
The International Monetary Fund's 
pressure for Sudan to export continues 
unabated. Even during the famine 
years of 1982-85, Sudan exported 
621,000 tonnes of sorghum to pay 
creditors. The country's debt has al- 
tered the pattern of land tenure in the 
country leaving large numbers of dis- 
placed with resentment toward the 
Jalleba. 
Reasons for Displacement 
By 1984, some 4.5 million people had 
become displaced. Their only alterna- 
tive was to move to towns and relief 
centres where food aid was available. 
This created dependency on begging, 
charity, occasional labour, theft or 
prostitution (Suliman 1993, 107). The 
country's situation is worsened by the 
move to a cash crop export economy 
making it vulnerable to international 
markets and the countrfs well publi- 
cized famine of 1984-85.' 
While there has been nearly con- 
tinuous fighting since independence 
in 1956, this past decade has been most 
destructive: claiming one million lives 
and uprooting perhaps three million 
southerners-roughly half the south- 
ern population-from their homes. 
Piece by piece, an entire civilization is 
being dismantled. The most recent es- 
calation of civil war in Sudan has con- 
tinued uninterrupted since 1983, when 
the civilian government in Khartoum 
adopted a program of Islamization for 
the whole country-a policy which 
resulted in the formation of the SPLA. 
The situation worsened with the mili- 
tary coup in 1989. General Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir seized power with 
the support of the National Islamic 
Front, a party resistant to any concilia- 
tion with the SPLA. The coup occurred 
just hours before government repre- 
sentatives were to meet with members 
of the rebel SPLA, and was staged to 
prevent the talks (Burr 1993, 3). At 
stake was the question of regional au- 
tonomy for the African peoples that 
inhabited the three southern prov- 
inces: Western and Eastern Equatoria, 
and Jonglei. The new military regime 
imposed a stricter Islamic Law, si- 
lenced or eliminated opponents in the 
North and forced the SPLA out of most 
of the areas it had previously control- 
led. In subsequent peace negotiations 
between the SPLA and the govern- 
ment, the unresolvable issue has been 
the government's unwillingness to re- 
peal imposed Islamic Laws for non- 
Muslims. 
There have been efforts to bring 
peace between the SPLA and the gov- 
ernment. A negotiated agenda was re- 
solved between SPLA factions at a 
meeting convened by government 
ministers from Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea 
and Ethiopia in January of this year, 
and SPLA negotiations with the Suda- 
nese government were to follow in 
Nairobi. Khartoum had supported 
these talks, but since February has 
taken a different course-war (Scot- 
tish Churches, 1994). 
Khartoum's failure to negotiate 
with the SPLA after neighbouring 
countries intervened in preparations 
for peace talks adds further support to 
the image of Khartoum as pariah. Most 
observers note that the government is 
more influenced by international than 
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internal pressure. But recently Khar- 
toum has cornered itself into a reliance 
on the members of the Islamic Confer- 
ence by alienating the rest of the world. 
Worse yet, its support for Iraq during 
the Gulf War created rifts within the 
Islamic Conference. 
The United Nations Human Rights 
Commission has accused Sudan of 
widespread executions, torture, deten- 
tion and expulsions, and voted to ap- 
point a special investigator. Last year 
the United States accused Khartoum of 
having close ties with Iran and Libya 
and harbouring known "terrorist 
groups," including the Palestinian* 
group Hamas, Islamic Holy War and 
the Party of God (Lorch 1993). More 
recently, the United States placed Su- 
dan on its list of countries that engage 
in terrorist activities. In early March 
1994, the UN special envoy to the coun- 
try submitted his report which has 
poised international human rights in- 
struments against Islamic law. Sudan 
responded by attacking not only the 
report but also the envoy-making 
him a minor Salman Rushdie (Econo- 
mist 1994, March 5). 
Since 1991, the SPLA has become a 
less effective opposition due to a split 
into at least three different factions. 
This dissension seems to have eased 
the government's intention to plunder 
the south. Consider recent infighting 
between SPLA factions in the context 
of the Government's role in the south. 
At the beginning of the presevt dry 
season, in December 1993, a stalemate 
occurred with John Garang's SPLA- 
Mainstream holding most of Equatoria 
and RiekMachais SPLA-United hold- 
ing the Upper Nile. At this time the 
government held several of the main 
towns. In January it built up troops 
and supplies in Wan and Jab$ and in 
February began aerial bombardment 
of remote SPLA-held towns and vil- 
lages. This turned the stalemate with 
the SPLA into a major dry season of- 
fensive with theintention of cutting off 
Garang's Ugandan supply lines. 
Camps for the displaced and refugees 
have been targeted as well as towns 
and villages. In the offensive against 
John Garang's SPLA-Mainstream, 
SPLA-United is reported to have col- 
luded with government troops 
(Chazan 1994, February 10). By Febru- 
ary2,280,000 people had fled to Kenya, 
Uganda and Zalre. The SPLA called for 
the UN to impose sanctions on Khar- 
toum and to establish an air exclusion 
zone in the south. 
Few observers believe that a mili- 
tary solution is possible in Sudan. 
While the government may currently 
control more of the south than a few 
months prior, the rainy season will 
again stop major military operations. 
The difficulty of maintaining this con- 
trol, given the long supply lines and 
deep antipathy of the region's popula- 
tion, has been proven in the past. In 
this situation aid agencies struggle to 
prevent mass deaths of people with no 
food supply. Fortunately, Western at- 
tention is increasingly being focused 
on Sudan. Christian leaders have vis- 
ited to help bring attention to the hu- 
man destruction that is occurring in 
the south: the Pope visited in 1992 and 
the Archbishop of Canterbury visited 
in late 1993learly 1994. There is a con- 
tinuing opening and closing of famine- 
affected regions to journalists and 
international aid agencies which 
shows that the government does in- 
deed respond to.Western pressure. The 
following considers the struggle which 
aid agencies have experienced in the 
past few years in Sudan. 
International Aid Agencies in 
Sudan 
The massive famine due to civil war 
and drought in 1984-85 was followed 
with an even worse famine between 
1986 and 1988. In this latter period the 
UN estimates that three million Suda- 
nese were displaced. Between 400,000 
and 500,000 persons died during this 
period (Minear 1991, 6). Inadequate 
rainfall followed this tragedy. In 1990- 
91 there was again crop failure and the 
numbers of destitute and dispossessed 
continued to grow. In November 1991, 
it was reported that "even the birds 
have moved south" froh northern 
Kordofan and Sodiri, a town of 20,000 
people, was nearly de~erted.~ Simi- 
larly in 1993, a report by USAID-Sudan 
noted that observers flying over a vast 
area around Ayod and Waat, where 
some 300,000 head of cattle had been 
enumerated in the early 19808, sighted 
"not one single  COW."^ For the Dinka, a 
people for whom cattle is the basis of 
commerce, there could be no greater 
tragedy (Burr 1993,24). 
Over the course of time many of the 
Nilotic peoples from the Upper Nile 
and Bahr el Ghazal provinces (see 
mapbthe Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk- 
fled to the squatter settlements that 
ring Khartoum. The city's Muslim in- 
habitants have treated these people 
severely. Over the decade, various 
governments in Khartoum have insti- 
tuted campaigns to disperse the squat- 
ters and destroy their settlements. In 
1990, a displaced southerner living in 
northern Sudan a u l d  hardly expect to 
own land, drink clean water, attend 
school, be vaccinated, vote, or raise 
objections to the government's pros- 
ecution of the war in the southern 
Sudan (Burr 1993,2). 
Nearly one-quarter of the children liv- 
ing in these encampments are severely 
malnourished, two-thirds live in 
unsanitary conditions and only 10 per- 
cent of the displaced children attend 
school (ibid, 7). International aid aged- 
cies have worked together to form an 
institution that coordinates aid activi- 
ties. 
Operation Lifeline Sudan ~ o r m e d  
In response to the effects of civil war 
and the famines of the 1980s, the UN, 
NGOs and International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) successfully ne- 
gotiated the formation of Operation 
Lifeline Sudan (OLS) with the govern- 
ment of Sudan and the SPLA. This fa- 
cilitated a large, coordinated relief 
effort between ICRC, UNICEF, World 
Food Program (WFP) and INGOs via 
negotiated "corridors of tranquillity." 
The Islamic African Relief Agency, the 
Sudan Council of Churches and local 
NGOs also took part in providing aid. 
Between March 1989 and December 
1990 direct contributions to the OLS 
reached $200 million and in total, $300 
million of resources were delivered to 
one and a half million people. War ex- 
penditures in the same eight month 
period, however, exceeded $400 mil- 
lion for the Sudanese Government 
(RPG 1992,38). Generally, it is agreed 
that this first OLS, or "OLS I," was a 
huge success. It demonstrated to the 
aid community that it was possible to 
provide humanitarian relief in the 
midst of a civil war (ibid). 
Although famine and war contin- 
ued into 1991, it was not possible to 
obtain agreement from the govern- 
ment and the SPLA to mount an OLS 11, 
nor the following yeai's OLS 111. Re- 
cently, however, a new agreement has 
been made between the government, 
SPLA and aid agencies for safe access 
to provide food aid (Economist 1994, 
February 26). 
During the interim when OLS I1 and 
I11 failed to gain endorsement by all 
parties, aid agencies were treated by 
both the government and the SPLA 
with repugnance. An example is a case 
which occurred in mid-1990 in which 
USAID attempted to transport food 
aid by barge southwa~d from KBsti 
(see map). An agreement was in effect 
dating back to 1986, when both the 
government and the SPLA agreed not 
to attack barges carrying humanitar- 
ian assistance. The barge stood by at 
K6sti intending to move aid south- 
ward to Malakgl. The government had 
not been able, however, to dislodge the 
SPLA from Melut and used "regional 
security conditions" to block the 
movement of food aid. The people of 
MalaMl, who had not received food 
aid in nearly a year, started to move 
northward. Military officials, seeking 
to avoid reports of large numbers of 
displaced in the area, ordered the de- 
parture of the last of the expatriate 
INGOs working south of KBsti (Burr 
1993,12). Using aerial attack, the gov- 
ernment then attempted to sink the 
barge. Their effort was not successful, 
but civilian casualties did result. 
USAID, the instigator of OLS, uses 
satellite technology information to 
predict food needs in famine prone 
regions through Famine Early Warn- 
ing System (FEWS) project (Nature 
1991,545). In the winter of 1990, FEWS 
estimated that five to six million Suda- 
nese could starve with eleven million 
affected in 1991 if multinational assist- 
ance was not received. The govern- 
ment, however, seemed unconcerned 
with the projection and blamed inter- 
national relief agencies for the domes- 
tic food shortage because they had 
been buying up domestic sorghum.' 
The editor of the government's news- 
paper made public its attitude toward 
the foreigners: 
The Sudanese people are smart 
enough to understand that most of 
the relief agencies have religious ob- 
jectives and many of the Western 
agencies understand relief as offer- 
ing assistance to the rebels in south- 
ern Sudan. It is not beyond the 
Sudanese people's intelligence to 
know that the problem of the South 
would not have been so aggravated 
if the Western agencies had not sup- 
plied [the SPLA] with the means of 
subsistence and added fuel to the fire 
in the form of arms, ammunition and 
food. 
Planning for OLS I11 was due to com- 
mence during the Gulf War that began 
in January of 1991. Meetings with high 
level UN personnel did occur, but Su- 
dan's support for Iraq created consid- 
erable tension between the 
government and the international 
community. In the end, OLS 111 could 
not be negotiated, for as one senior 
Western official put it: "We don't trust 
them and they don't trust us."5 Given 
the worsening relations in Sudan, 
USAID/Sudan announced on October 
1, 1991 that it planned to cease being 
the primary implementing agency for 
food aid in Sudan, transferring that 
function to the WFP. Further, al l  eco- 
nomic development projects were ter- 
minated for 1992. At the same time, the 
government restricted INGO access to 
the settlements it was creating to re- 
place squatter settlements around 
Khartoum and the Nuba Mountains. 
The political climate in Sudan contin- 
ued to decline and by late 1991, INGOs 
like Save the Children-Canada pulled 
out of Sudan. In essence, only UNICEF 
and the WFP, both of which demanded 
little accountability of the relief sup- 
plies provided to Sudanese agencies, 
were left to service the displaced 
around Khartoum by 1992 (Burr 1993, 
26). More recently the situation has 
improved with the signing of a new 
OLS agreement that gives aid agencies 
limited access to the countrfs interior 
(Economist 1994, February 26). 
The Sudanese Government, SPLA 
and International Involvement 
The events that led to the decision of 
many aid agencies to leave Sudan in 
late 1991 were characterized by the 
government and SPLA using their 
power to frustrate relief efforts. Both 
groups at times blocked, diverted 
and/or destroyed aid and assets, such 
as the senseless bombing of ICRC's 
food aid barge. 
In the fallof 1990, for example, when 
drought and war led to dramatic in- 
creases in the price of cereals in Khar- 
toum, the Minister of Commerce 
ordered the sequestration of all food 
stocks held outside government ware- 
houses. Both the UN and U.S. Ambas- 
sador to Sudan raised strong 
objections to the government's behav- 
iour but could not persuade al-Bashir 
to release the relief food or admit pub- 
licly that there existed the possibility 
of a famine in Sudan. For a short time 
in November 1990, Washington cut off 
food aid passing through Khartoum, 
instead diverting maize supplies from 
Kenya to southern Sudan. Later in the 
month, the government's representa- 
tive at the United Nations quietly ap- 
pealed for "immediate food assistance 
of 75,000 tons for urgent delivery to 
drought stricken areasa6 Donors 
quickly came forward. 
The government has attempted to 
rectify its food dependency through a 
number of national campaigns. In 
January 1990, it made the elimination 
of wheat imports a national goal when 
it ordered an increase in wheat cultiva- 
tion to 255,000 hectares. In a speech 
made by al-Bashir in North Darfur 
people were told, 
Because we do not want to beg for 
our food and we do not want the 
relief agencies to humiliate our dig- 
nity, through you the homeland and 
through your production, we will rid 
ourselves of this bitter humiliation.' 
- 
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Translated into action, Bashir's pro- 
nouncement became a desperate situa- 
tion when the government decided not 
to send aid in the months following the 
region's poor harvest. Later, the IMF 
commented that the precarious state of 
fwd reserves in 1990 was caused by 
the sale of "large stocks" of grain 
abroad. Even more sickening, the New 
York Times noted that the foreign ex- 
change earned was "spent on weap- 
onry from China to continue the civil 
Conclusion 
The problems in Sudan seem resolv- 
able only through increased toleration 
on the part of the government and the 
SPLA factions. A mixture of human 
induced problems, including the 
IMF's loan policy, has made Sudan an 
economic basket case-a condition 
that will continue for many years to 
come. Beyond ethnic tensions and ef- 
forts to impose Islamic hegemony, 
changes in land tenure have marginal- 
ized fanners and nomadic peoples to 
the point that their lives may never 
resemble what they were in the past. 
Further, the accompanying destruc- 
tive farming practices are ruining the 
fragile soil of an unnecessarily poor 
nation. 
Efforts to provide aid have contin- 
ued in Sudan, even with the frustra- 
tion of the government's contrary 
policies and practices. Aid agencies 
seem able to rise above the mayhem 
and focus on the marginalized who 
regularly starve. At times the need for 
aid calls into question the govern- 
ment's claim to legitimacy and 
sovereignty. If Sudan were more geo- 
politically, or economically interesting 
to the West-particularly the United 
States-a military challenge might be 
levelled against the government. Yet, 
as recent history shows, Western mili- 
tary intervention is rarely effective and 
civilian casualties are often higher than 
expected. 
Viewed historically, and optirnisti- 
cally, the current condition in Sudan 
might be viewed as a Western-style 
evolution from subsistence farming to 
an industrial economy. What further 
complicates this transition in Sudan, 
however, is the presence of civil war, 
massive debt burden, and a worldwide 
recession that when considered to- 
gether leave the resultant displaced 
labour out of the economy. The situa- 
tion for these former subsistence farm- 
ers and nomadic peoples is grim. What 
makes their situation worse, from an 
outsider's view, is that this displace- 
ment is indirectly supported by the 
international economic system that is 
insensitive to the repercu'ssions of loan 
repayments. So while economic re- 
sources have been made available to 
Sudan, life for a large part of the popu- 
lation is desperate.. 
Notes 
1. Suliman (1993a, 107) citing Duffield, M. 
(1990,8). 
2. Burr (1993,16) citing AIDIOFDA (1990, 
August 24). 
3. Burr (1993,16) citing Lautzse and Wagner 
(1993). 
4 Burr (1993,16) citing New Horizon (1990, 
November 3). 
5. Burr (1993, 16) citing Washington Post 
(1991, February 23). 
6. Burr (1993, 16) citing Washington Times 
(1990, November 2). 
7. Burr (1993,4) citing Radio Omdurman, 
1715 GMT, February 4,1990. 
8. Burr(1993,4) atingNew YorkTimes (1991, 
May 12). 
References 
AIDIOFDA. 1990. "Sudan-civil strifeldis- 
placed persons." Washington DC, Au- 
gust 24. 
Burr, M. 1993. Sudan 1990-92: Foodaid, Famine 
and failure. Washington DC: U.S. Com- 
mittee for Refugees. 
Chazan, David. 1994. "Khartoum bombers hit 
divided rebels." London Zmes, February 10. 
Denger, Francis M. and Larry Minear. The 
chalknges offamine relit$ Emergency opera- 
tions in the Sudan. Washington: The 
Brookings Institution. 
Duffield, M. 1990. Sudan at the crossroads. In- 
stitute of Development Studies Discus- 
sion Paper 275. Sussex University. 
The Economist. 1994. "Sudan cites higher au- 
thority." March 5,4243. 
- .1994. "In flight." February 26,434. 
- .1994. "Thelost years." February12,39-40. 
Flint, Julie. 1993. "Nuba rebel leader appeals 
to Britain." Manchester Guardian, May 24. 
- . 1993. "Battle to neat Sudan's tains." 
Manchester Guardian, April 30. 
- 1993. "Warpath in North Africa." Man- 
chester Guardian, April 24. 
- .1993. "Freedom galls to the charm of- 
fensive." Manchester Guardian, April 22. 
- .1993. "Aid gnaws at the edges of the 
hunger triangle." Manchester Guardian, 
March 17. 
- 1993. "Trickle of hope for Sudan's starv- 
ing." Manchester Guardian, March 10. 
Grinker, Lori. 1993. "Disaster in the Sudan." 
Nnu York Times, February 12, A33. 
Hazell, Gillian. 1993. "Villages destroyed by 
war." World Food Program Journal, 26:6. 
Huband, Mark. 1993. "Aid agencies pull out 
of Southern Sudan after SPLA faction's 
threat." London Times, April 1. 
Kiley, Sam. 1993. "Famine fear in Sudan as 
army attacks the rebels." London Times, 
August 12. 
Lautzse, S. and G. Wagner. 1993. "Southern 
Sudan relief operations." Nairobi: 
USAID-Sudan. 
Lorch, Donatella. 1993. "Sudan is described 
as trying to placate the West." New York 
Times, March 26, A3. 
Minear, Larry. 1991. Operation Lffrline Sudan, 
Trenton, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press. 
Nature. 1991. "Spotting famine from space." 
Nature 350545. 
Nnu Horizon. 1990. "No famine in Sudan: 
Karar blames agencies for supply short- 
age." Khartoum, November 3. 
New York Times. 1991. 'African dilemma: 
Food aid may prolong war and famine." 
May 12, E3. 
Refugee Policy Group. 1992. "Sudan." Inter- 
nally displaced persons in Africa: Assistance 
challenges and opportunities. Washington: 
RPG. 
Rogge, John. 1985. Too many, Too long: Sudan's 
twenty-year refupdilemma. Totowa, New 
Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld. 
Scottish Churches' Sudan Group. 1994. "War 
and peace." PeaceNet, February 5. 
Suliman, Mohamed. 1993. "Civil war in the 
Sudan: From ethnic to ecological con- 
flict." The Ecologist 23(3):104-109. 
- 1993a. "Civil war in Sudan: The impact 
of ecological degradation." Distributed 
by g.23129-O@eros.britain.eu.net in 
gn.apc.org, October 15. 
United Nations. 1994. Memo to NGOs inter- 
estedin the Horn of Africa re: World Food 
Programme Reports, February 23. 
Washington Post. 1991. "Sudan's government 
still won't ask for help as drought grows 
worse." February 23, A6. 
Washington Times. 1990. "Sudan government 
denies new famine." November 2. a 
Refige, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1994) 
Refuge Vol. 14 No. 1 April 1994 CANADA'S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES 
REFUGE 
w w e  
York Lanes Press 
Centre for Refugee Studies 
Suite 351, York Lanes, York University 
4700 Keele Street, North York 
Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3 
Phone: (416) 7365843 Fax: (416) 736-5837 
Electronic Mail via Bitnet Address: 
refuge@vml.yorku.ca 
Postage Paid in Toronto, Canada 
Second Class Mail Registration No. 5512 
Return Postage Guaranteed 
Development Aid 
and Repatriation 
